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The Role of Mediation in Public
Interest Disputes
By BARBARA ASHLEY PHILLIPS*
and ANTHONY C. PIAZZA**
In recent years this country's traditional reliance on the courts to
resolve disputes has come under serious question.' Although there is
some evidence that as a society we are no more litigious than we have
ever been, the quality and mix of our litigation certainly has changed.
2
Many rights being asserted in litigation today did not exist twenty years
ago.3 Also, courts have increasingly recognized private rights of action
for wrongs for which statutory remedies were non-existent or were lim-
* President of American Intermediation Service, a San Francisco-based organization
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lation Subcommittee of the ABA Labor Section's Committee on Individual Rights and Re-
sponsibilities in the Workplace; former Assistant U.S. Attorney and private civil litigator.
A.B., 1957, University of California; LL.B., 1961, Yale Law School.
** Attorney with American Intermediation Service, specializing in mediation and
other non-litigative alternatives to dispute resolution; former Special Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney and private civil litigator. B.A., 1971, Boston College; J.D., 1974, New York University.
1. See, e.g., Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of
Swoi and Certain Justice Has AffectedAdudication in American Courts, 29 BUFFALO L. REV.
487, 502-03 (1980).
Professor Leonard L. Riskin attributes the American emphasis on adversarial alterna-
tives to our national culture, which places a high value on "freedom as an absence of re-
straint and on autonomy and individual liberty as the highest goal." He contrasts the
Confucian emphasis on harmony as the natural and desirable condition. Riskin, Mediation
and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 30 (1982).
2. See J. LEIBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOcIETY (1981); Cavanaugh & Sarat, Thinking
About Courts: Toward and Beyond a Jurisprudence ofJudicial Competence, 14 LAW & Soc'y
REv. 371, 420 (1980); Friedman, The Six Million Dollar Man: Litigation and Rights Con-
sciousness in Modern America, 39 MD. L. REV. 661 (1980); Hufstedler, New Blocks/or Old
Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial System, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 901, 907 (1971). These sources
are cited in an unpublished paper by Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:
What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Alledged, Contentious
andLitigious Society, presented at the National Conference on the Lawyer's Changing Role
in Resolving Disputes, Oct. 1982, at the Harvard Law School (on file with the authors). It is
worth noting that in California one out of every hundred citizens files a lawsuit each year.
Lundquist, Humanizing Litigation, LITIGATION, Spring 1978, at 3, 4.
3. For example, the right not to be discriminated against in employment based on
race or sex, the extension of the protections of due process to large classes of individuals
including welfare recipients, prisoners, and the mentally ill, and the requirement of environ-
mental impact reports, are all relatively recent developments.
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ited to administrative enforcement. 4
The rapid development of public interest law5 in the past two de-
cades has contributed to the expansion of legally cognizable rights.
Both through landmark decisions 6 and the skillful use of publicity,
7
public interest litigators have had a profound impact on our society
and the way we do business. Yet, despite the many dramatic successes
achieved by public interest litigants in the courts, there are good rea-
sons to consider alternative approaches for resolving public interest
disputes.
The economic motivation propelling other civil litigants toward al-
ternatives to litigation8 is equally apparent in the public interest sector. 9
4. On the implication of private rights of action under federal statutes, see articles
collected in Note, Private Rights of Action Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972.- Cannon v. University of Chicago, 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 141, 142 n.8 (1980). See also
Ronfeldt, Implying Rights ofAction For Minorities and the Poor Through Presumptions of
Legislative Intent, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 969 (1983).
5. The term "public interest law" first was applied in the mid-1960's to the work of
legal groups making efforts to secure legal services for those lacking them. Note, In Defense
of an Embattled Mode of Advocacy: An Analysis and Justification of Public Interest Practice,
90 YALE L.J. 1436, 1436 n.3 (1981). See Cooke, Public Interest Law and Lawyersfor the
Public Interest, 34 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 6, 7 (1979).
Examples of public interest litigators include the American Civil Liberties Union,
which emphasizes personal freedoms and assumes that if government is to serve the public
interest, it must be closely monitored from the outside; the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
which uses law strategically to lay the groundwork for political change; the Legal Services
Corporation, which acts as an independent monitor of government and private activities
affecting the poor; the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, which involves
private lawyers in representing and legitimizing unrepresented interests in constitutional and
statutory law enforcement; and the public interest law firms, supported by foundations and
the general public, such as the Environmental Defense Fund, the Public Citizen Litigation
Group, and Public Advocates, Inc., which address the concerns of environmentalists, con-
sumers, the elderly, children, women, prisoners, and many other under-represented constitu-
encies. COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, REPORT: BALANCING THE SCALES OF
JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA 19-21 (1976); Note, supra, at 1436
n.3.
6. For a list of cases, see Note, supra note 5, at 1437 n.6.
7. The public education aspect of public interest practice can be a major service in
itself. Although Mr. Wolinsky and Ms. Arriola, in their accompanying Commentary, Public
Interest Practice in Practice. The Law and Reality, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1207 (1983), point to
Committeefor Childrens' Television Inc. v. General Foods Corp., No. 61056 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d
Dist., Mar. 30, 1982), as a "non-victory," Arriola & Wolinsky, supra, at 1221-23, the public-
ity surrounding that suit and the F.T.C. hearings which followed have gone a long way
toward educating the public about the nutritional value of sugared breakfast cereals. It is not
suprising that a major consideration in decisions about the initiation and conduct of public
interest litigation is the potential impact of publicity about the litigation. Letter from Greg
Thomas (lawyer for the Committee for Childrens' Television Inc.) to Howard Herman (May
24, 1983) (on file at the HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL Office).
8. See, e.g., the Keynote Address by Chief Justice Warren Burger to the Pound Con-
ference, Agendafor 2000 A.D.-A Needfor Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 92 (1976).
More recently, the Rand Corporation has released a study which found that the average cost
[Vol. 34
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Public interest lawyers know that resources are scarce and that their
commitment to one battle means that another must be foregone. In a
time of decreased public funding,' 0 survival of public interest lawyer-
ing may depend upon the availability of cost-effective alternatives to
litigation. "
Additionally, the substantial delays involved in litigation' 2 may
rob public interest litigants of many of the benefits they turned to litiga-
tion to achieve.13 Too often, the remedies available through litigation
also fall short of complete relief.
14
for processing a tort case through jury trial in federal district court exceeded the average
award for such cases. Report by Dr. James S. Kakalik and Abby Robyn, "Costs of the Civil
District Court: Expenditures for Processing Tort Cases," Rand Corp., Santa Monica, Cal.,
Oct. 1982. This is, of course, in addition to the costs and attorneys fees borne by the parties.
Commenting on a preliminary draft of this study, Chief Justice Burger observed, "If this is
correct, we need to ask whether it is wise to continue using taxpayers' money in this man-
ner." Burger, Arbitration, Not Litigation, NATION'S Bus., Aug. 1982, at 52.
9. See, e.g., Everett, Financial Assistancefor Public Interest Group Particpation in En-
vironmentalDecisionmaking, 10 ENVTL. L. 483 (1980) (mounting financial pressures on pub-
lic interest groups in the environmental sector).
10. Note, supra note 5, at 1437 n.8.
11. See Green, Marks & Olson, Settling Large Case Litigation: An Alternative Ap-
proach, I 1 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 493 (1978) (cataloguing the expenses of large suits, and offering
an example of an alternative dispute resolution process succeeding in practice in the kind of
complex litigation that characterizes many public interest disputes).
12. By way of example, the Judicial Council of California has noted that the median
time to decision for civil cases (from the date on which notice of appeal is filed to the filing
of the Appellate court's decision) ranges from one year to twenty-nine months. JUD. COUN-
CIL OF CAL., 1982 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 62 & Table
XIV (1982).
13. Burger, supra note 8, at 53-54.
14. See, e.g., Comment, The Limits of Litigation: Public Housing Site Selection and the
Failure of Injunctive Relief, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1330 (1974). Using the example of suits
against local housing authorities, this comment suggests the extent to which court victories
can be nullified by the difficulty of enforcing court-ordered change against a public agency
defendant with broad discretionary powers. The author observes that, for a variety of rea-
sons, including the difficulty of identifying a responsible individual, courts are hesitant to
exercise their sole real enforcement power--citation for contempt-against public officials.
Even when the defendants attempt to comply with a court-ordered program, the practi-
cal problems of implementation and monitoring compliance can be enormous. See, e.g.,
Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change,
84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975) (tracking the implementation of a judicial decree ordering Ala-
bama's state hospital system to deliver adequate treatment to mentally impaired patients).
An additional problem with judicial resolution of public interest law suits is that it
forces the judiciary into a legislative role. See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). Although Professor Chayes felt that,
on balance, the judiciary could be entrusted with this expanded role, he noted the very
serious problems inherent in subjecting both the parties to a suit (and a multitude of non-
parties) to continual judicial oversight of regulatory policy devised by the court. By con-
trast, mediated negotiations allow public agencies to maintain their delegated role of ad-
ministering policies set by the legislature; the agencies simply are given the opportunity to
perform that role with the advantage of input from the most directly concerned sector of the
May/July 1983]
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This Commentary addresses one alternative to litigation: media-
tion.I5 First, the mediation process is described. Then its application to
public interest disputes is explained. Finally, two proposals are ad-
vanced for incorporating mediation into the process of resolving public
interest disputes.
The Mediation Process
Mediation is facilitated negotiation. Mediators are used by parties
to a dispute to: 1) depersonalize the dispute, thus reducing the level of
emotion; 2) enable discussion to take place when the parties are not
willing to talk directly to one another; 3) permit confidential informa-
tion to be used to facilitate a settlement without revealing it to the other
side; 4) clarify issues and identify the interests of the parties; 5) develop
new options for a mutually satisfactory resolution; and 6) prevent con-
flict aftermath. 16
Mediation is distinct from arbitration, the most familiar alterna-
tive dispute resolution mechanism. The following chart' 7 illustrates





3. Mediator selected by the
disputants
4. Mediator can explore
broad avenues of cause,
help identify issues, and
explore alternatives for
resolution
5. Disputants rarely submit
evidence or have witnesses





3. Arbitrator selected by the
disputants
4. Arbitrator can address
only those issue-questions
which the parties have
jointly agreed to submit
5. Disputants can submit
evidence and have
witnesses
public. See M. CAPPELLETTI & J. JOLOWICZ, PUBLIC INTEREST PARTIES AND THE ROLE OF
THE JUDGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION (1975).
15. Although this Commentary focuses on mediation, it should be noted that a wide
variety of alternative dispute resolution procedures have been developed, including neutral
fact finding, the mini-trial, and a combined mediation-arbitration procedure. See "Alterna-
tive Methods of Dispute Settlement, A Selected Bibliography," compiled by the Special
Committee on Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution of the American Bar Association.
Dec. 1979, and updated May 1982.
16. Conflict aftermath is the continuation of conflict after the apparent resolution of a
dispute.
17. Reprinted by permission of the American Intermediation Service and William F.
Lincoln from a manual on negotiation and mediation.
[Vol. 34
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6. Disputants participate in
developing procedures
7. Mediator can have private
meetings (caucuses) with a
disputant




9. Mediator has no authority
to render a decision
10. No decisions, only
settlement agreements
between the parties
11. Primarily interested in
"mutual gain" resolutions
6. Disputants do not
participate in developing
procedures
7. Arbitrator cannot have
private meetings (caucuses)
with a disputant
8. Disputants do not
participate in the decision-
making process regarding
substantive outcomes
9. Arbitrator has authority to
render a decision
10. Decision is "final and
binding"
11. Determines "right" and
"wrong," or guilt and
innocence, rectification
Mediators are "process" experts. To be effective, they need not
have expertise in the subject of the dispute. Initially, they help the par-
ties decide what is to be discussed and how the discussions are to take
place. The parties decide whether, and when, to bring in experts.
Mediation also offers the parties maximum control over the pro-
cess of resolving the conflict, an opportunity to redefine the area of
discussion so that the larger interests can be served, and a collaborative
framework rarely found in formal proceedings. Even when direct ne-
gotiations have broken down, mediation can provide a face-saving pro-
cedure for reestablishing communication among the parties.
For decades, mediation had proven an effective means of resolving
complex disputes in the field of organized labor. 18 More recently, me-
diation has become an important adjunct to litigation in family law
matters. 19 Parties frequently involved in general civil litigation also are
beginning to investigate alternatives to adverserial processes.
20
To date, state legislation concerning mediation has been limited.
2 1
However, the number and scope of mediation programs are increasing
18. For a discussion of mediation in the collective bargaining context, see W. SIMKIN,
MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1971).
19. In California, for example, mediation is mandated for child custody matters in di-
vorce cases. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West. Supp. 1983). A substantial segment of the fam-
ily law bar nationwide is beginning to utilize collaborative processes, including having the
same lawyer-or in some cases a lawyer and therapist team-work with the separating
couple. See generally AM. BAR ASS'N, ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION (1982); Riskin, supra note 1.
20. See, e.g., "'Managing" Company Lawsuits to Stay Out of Court, Bus. WK., Aug. 23,
1982, at 59.
21. For a compilation of state laws relating to mediation, see STATE LEGISLATION ON
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (A.B.A. Special Committee on Alternative Means of Dispute Resolu-
tion Monograph No. 1, June 1982).
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dramatically.22 There is reason to believe that mediation also can con-
tribute substantially to the resolution of public interest disputes.
The Value of Mediation in Public Interest Disputes
Three characteristics of public interest litigation particularly sug-
gest the value of mediation in public interest disputes: 1) the tendency
of the parties to take positions based on principle that put the essentials
of discussion beyond negotiation; 2) the fact that much public interest
litigation never actually resolves the underlying controversies; and 3)
the frequent failure of government defendants to identify someone to
take responsibility for settling disputes. Following the discussion of
each of these characteristics is a description of how mediation can
help.2
3
Much Public Interest Litigation Is Instituted and Maintained Because the
Parties Take Positions Based on Principles That Are Beyond
Negotiation
Professor Marc Galanter of University of Wisconsin Law School
has analyzed nonsettling cases to determine the reason for their longev-
ity. He concludes that these hard-to-settle cases often involve situa-
tions in which a party needs the judicial declaration itself, rather than
simply a settlement of the immediate dispute.24 In some cases a litigant
wants to secure a declaration of "good law."2 5 In others, a premium is
placed on having an external agency make the decision. 26 Frequently,
accepting a negotiated resolution is perceived as weakening the future
22. Ronald L. Olson, Chair of the A.B.A. Special Committee on Alternative Means of
Dispute Resolution, notes in his foreword to the monograph STATE LEGISLATION ON DIs-
PUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 21, that more than 400 private and government agencies are
currently providing informal dispute resolution services. In addition, 188 communities in 38
states have established "neighborhood justice centers." For a description of an exemplary
program of this type, see SAN FRANCISCO COMMUNITY BOARDS, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT
(1981) (on file with authors). Mediation also has come to play an important role in the
juvenile justice field. See E. VORENBURG, A STATE OF THE ART SURVEY OF DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION PROGRAMS INVOLVING JUVENILES (1982).
23. There are other characteristics of public interest litigation that suggest the potential
value of mediation. For example, it is the authors' experience that public interest litigants
often use the threat of litigation to encourage settlement of the underlying issues. Media-
tion, as a more direct method of bringing the parties to the negotiating table, would be a
more efficient use of time and money and would better serve the public interest.
24. Galanter, supra note 2, at 24-25.
25. Id. at 26. Among the "good law" cases, perhaps the most famous is Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. Galanter, supra note 2, at 25. For example. a government or corporate employee
not wanting to take responsibility for a settlement might be very anxious to have a third
party decide the cause.
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bargaining credibility of a party.27 In other cases a vindication of fun-
damental values is sought.
28
Although such perceptions make settlement more difficult, the fact
is that parties in general civil litigation frequently change their percep-
tions of what is and is not negotiable. Almost ninety percent of all civil
lawsuits eventually settle.29 In contrast, perhaps only fifty percent of
the public interest cases settle.30 It is unclear how much of this differ-
ence in settlement rate is attributable to the inability of particular par-
ties to establish and maintain effective communication and how much
is attributable to the unique nature of public interest litigation. A look
at the process of mediated negotiations suggests, however, that its ap-
plication to public interest disputes could substantially reduce the need
for litigation.
The most important function of any negotiation is to educate the
parties about their own and opposing interests. This enables them to
take into account the perspectives and needs of all parties to the dispute
in considering settlement options. By utilizing an intermediary, this
educational process may even take place without face-to-face discus-
sions by the parties. The intermediary permits the parties to explore
possible resolutions without either party giving up its litigating stance
or revealing confidential information to other litigants.
Sometimes this educational process of settlement talks will induce
even the most committed believer in principle to substitute a negotiable
objective for a non-negotiable one which has contributed to impasse.
For example, a group that in principle opposes the building of nuclear
power plants might be persuaded to negotiate over the terms and con-
ditions on which a power plant would be built (or completed) if the
plant would use only waste fuels already generated by the nation's nu-
clear weapons program.
27. Id. Some trial lawyers feel impelled to try the hard cases, to maintain credibility in
further negotiations. Belli, Pretrial- Aid to the New Advocacy, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 34 (1957).
A frequent defendant such as a utility company may not want to make settlement too easy
for fear of encouraging further claims. An employer might be reluctant to compromise in a
dispute with one employee for fear that other employees will demand equal treatment.
28. Galanter, supra note 2, at 26. The National Rifle Association's efforts to strike
down legislation aimed at gun control is one example.
29. Id. at 23.
30. Letter from Sidney M. Wolinsky, co-founder of Public Advocates Inc. (May 19,
1983) (on file with the authors).
A lower rate of settlement is also suggested by statistics published by the Aministrative
Office of the United States Courts. For the 12-month period ending June 30, 1981, 16.8% of
all civil rights cases (excluding United States cases and prisoner petitions) reached trial.
This is compared to 6.6% for all civil cases generally. AD. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 1981
ANNUAL REPORT at table C4 (1981). The Administrative Office does not keep separate
statistics for public interest litigation other than civil rights cases. Civil rights cases (exclud-
ing United States cases and prisoner petitions) terminated within the same period also were
pending an average of one-third longer than civil cases in general. Id. at table C5A.
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Much Public Interest Litigation Never Resolves the Underlying Controversy
and Is Incapable of Doing So
Litigation, as well as settlement discussions ancillary to an adver-
sarial process, generally addresses only the legal issues in which the suit
is framed. Because the parties stand "in the shadow of the law,"' 3 ' they
may never address many of the real interests involved in the dispute.
Consider, for example, the action filed by Ralph Nader against
Allegheny Airlines seeking damages for being "bumped" from an
overbooked flight.32 Although the publicity generated by the suit ap-
parently did induce corrective measures by the airline industry and the
Civil Aeronautics Board,33 the remedy actually sought by Nader-
CAB prohibition of overbooking-was not even at issue in the
litigation.
34
Much of the litigation over environmental impact reports also falls
into this category. Usually, the plaintiffs want either to stop or to force
modification of a project. The legal issue employed to reach this result
is a claim that the project's environmental impact report is deficient. In
Las Raza Unida v. Voipe, 35 plaintiffs alleged that a California highway
project had failed to comply with various federal statutes dealing with
impact on the environment and housing. After protracted litigation.
plaintiffs obtained an injunction, which was upheld on appeal,36 and
attorneys fees. 3
7
The underlying interest of the plaintiffs in this case was to mini-
mize destruction of homes and parklands. 38 The interest of the defend-
ants was in furnishing improved transportation facilities. Were these
interests so adverse that no plan satisfying all parties could have been
developed? Or was it the absence of an effective alternative to litiga-
tion that forced these parties into adversary roles, in a lengthy and
costly series of court actions paid for by the public? This "successful"
public interest litigation did force some degree of consideration of the
conflict between the public interest in housing and recreation on the
one hand, and in transportation on the other. It did not meet the need
31. The phrase is taken from Mnookin & Kornhauser. Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law" The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979).
32. Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973). rev'd & remanded.
512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aftd. 426 U.S. 290 (1976), on remand, 445 F. Supp. 168
(D.D.C. 1978), rev'd. 626 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See Note, Court Usurpation of C4B
Function: The Problem of the "Bumped" Passenger, 43 UMKC L. REv. 112 (1974).
33. B. WEISBROD, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 413 (1978).
34. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1973, § 4, at 12, col. 1.
35. 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
36. 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 409 U.S. 890 (1972).
37. 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
38. The project, as originally planned, would have diplaced 5.000 persons and de-
stroyed a number of parks. Id. at 100.
to bring all interested parties together to develop options for satisfying
these conflicting interests.
39
Public Interest Disputes May Be Forced to Trial Because the Government
Defendant Fails to Identify Someone Who Will Take Responsibility
for Settling the Dispute
Public Advocates Inc., a public interest law firm with an impres-
sive record of court victories, believes that the failure of government
defendants to find someone who will take responsibility for settling dis-
putes is one of the most exasperating features of public interest
practice.4°
In Larry P. v. Riles,41 Public Advocates Inc. successfully sued to
prevent placement of black children in classes for the mentally retarded
on the basis of discriminatory I.Q. tests. Early in the dispute the State
Department of Education had grounds to decide that the tests were, in
fact, of questionable validity.42 The plaintiffs' counsel have told the
authors that they believe that the inability of the department to find
someone to take responsibility for settling the dispute forced the case to
trial. The result was that this case, filed in 1971, went on for nearly a
decade.43 Had a mediator helped to identify the interested parties and
to clarify their settlement authority in the early stages of Larry P., it is
possible that the judgment and lengthy appeal could have been
avoided.
39. A particularly poignant example of the need for effective mediation is furnished by
Bracco v. Lackner, 462 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. Cal. 1978). In that case plaintiffs sought to
prevent the abrupt closing of a San Francisco convalescent hospital for failure to comply
with state standards. Most of the primarily low income patients were on Medi-Cal and were
to be relocated to several facilities outside of San Francisco. Although the plaintiffs agreed
that the facility needed to be brought up to code, they wanted to avoid relocation, the result-
ing "transfer shock," and disruption of patient relationships. They brought suit on a due
process theory and won in district court. Id. The victory slowed down the closing process,
but the patients eventually were moved, the facility closed, and the much needed convales-
cent beds lost.
Both the state and the patients had a strong interest in maintaining this facility. In fact,
a bill was subsequently passed by the state legislature providing for the appointment of a
receiver in such a situation. In a real sense, both the state and the attorneys for the plaintiffs
were seeking to care for the interests of the same clients. A mediation could have brought
together all of the interested parties at the beginning of the dispute, allowing exploration of a
variety of options including receivership before mounting time pressures forced a closure of
the facility.
40. See Arriola & Wolinsky, supra note 7, at 1225-27.
41. 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
42. Id. at 931-35. See also Larry P. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), a'd,
502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (ordering and affirming preliminary injunction).
43. See 495 F. Supp. at 932-34 ("For a period of time it was thought that the Master
Plan for special education in California, enacted in 1974, would address and perhaps rem-
edy the problems raised by this case, but that hope never materialized. The case had to be
brought to trial on the merits.").
ROLE OF MEDIATIONMay/July 19831
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The Value of Mediation
Mediation can solve these problems of public interest litigation.
The mediation process focuses on each party's underlying interests
from the beginning, when the issues for discussion are being developed
and clarified. Mediators can help the parties use their differing needs
and perspectives as the basis for achieving a mutually acceptable reso-
lution rather than just seeing these differing interests as reasons to
disagree.
Mediation of complex public interest disputes has proven success-
ful in practice. The Institute for Environmental Mediation in Seattle,
Washington, has investigated the applicability of mediation in more
than fifty disputes and has settled a dozen complex lawsuits. One rep-
resentative case is the Riverside Community Landfill Dispute,44 which
involved a dispute over a proposed replacement site for two existing
landfills. With the aid of the Institute mediators, the parties realized
that there could be no negotiated resolution as long as the focus was
solely on an agreement over the proposed site. They therefore broad-
ened their discussion to address the basic issue: what to do with the
garbage. Industry representatives and environmentalists were included
in the discussions. The result was that the entire group reached an
agreement on a much broader set of solid waste issues in addition to
agreeing on a replacement landfill site.
45
As this case shows, failure to pursue collaborative discussions may
be more costly than losing any particular settlement opportunity.46 It is
a lost opportunity for mutual education, for building consensus which
will serve important long-term interests, and for resolving differences
which otherwise cause additional clashes in the future.
One factor impeding the use of mediation in the public interest
sector is that many public interest disputants only rarely become in-
volved in the legal process; 47 they are consequently less experienced
than corporate disputants at developing and implementing preventive
strategies.48 Public interest law firms and organizations do engage in
44. Institute case files are case name-indexed. This case was mediated by Alana
Kastner.
45. THE INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION, SUMMARY REPORT TO THE
VISITING COMMITTEE (May 1982) (on file at HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL Office).
46. For other examples in the public interest field, see generally AM. ARBITRATION
AsS'N, MEDIATION: A TRANSFERABLE PROCESS FOR THE PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION OF
RACIAL CONFLICT IN PUBLIC SECONDARY SCHOOLS (1976): Conference Report, "'Conflict
Management: Its Application to Energy Disputes," Engineering Foundation Conference.
Rindge, N. H. (Aug. 1979) (on file with authors); Reynolds & Tonry, Professional Mediation
Services for Prisoners' Complaints, 67 A.B.A. J. 294-97 (1981).
47. Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead- Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change. 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 98 (1974).
48. G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 141 (1978).
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dispute resolution planning similar to that in the private sector.49 How-
ever, the planning often centers on selecting targets for litigation. It is
not preventive planning that encompasses consideration of alternative
dispute resolution procedures. How then, can alternative dispute reso-
lution processes such as mediation be incorporated into the process of
resolving public interest disputes? The present under-utilization of
mediation comes not so much from a rejection of the collaborative ap-
proach as from a misunderstanding of the process and from excessive
and conditioned reliance upon litigation. Also, governments make no
budgetary allowance for such settlement services.
50
Some Modest Proposals
The following proposals are modest in that they do not require
major commitments of resources before they can be tested in a variety
of situations. Indeed, as funding for public interest advocacy becomes
increasingly scarce,51 the cost-effectiveness of mediation as compared
to litigation will be more readily appreciated: mediated settlement dis-
cussion are measured in days, or even in hours, rather than in the years
required by litigation.
Nor is complicated new legislation needed at this time. It seems
wiser to test new mediation programs experimentally before enshrin-
ing-and thus limiting-them in legislation. Moreover, because the
mediation process works only with voluntary participation, there is less
need for legislative mandate. All that really will be needed is the op-
portunity to see how mediation can help; the marketplace will decide
whether it should be incorporated formally into our dispute resolution
processes, and on what scale.
Our first proposal is that the courts screen cases for mediated set-
tlement discussions.5 2 In this way, the courts could do much to help
test the viability of mediation in the public interest field.
53
The courts are already in the referral business in many areas for
the purpose of channeling cases into arbitration.54 Although mediation
49. L. MAYHEW, LAW AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 164 (1968).
50. From the authors' personal experience litigating both on behalf of and against the
United States government, it would appear that the Department of Justice approaches litiga-
tion cost control solely by tinkering with the amounts available for expenditure in litigation.
Perhaps no one has considered any other alternative.
51. See supra note 13 & accompanying text.
52. For some time such projects have received serious consideration in federal court
administration policy discussions. See, e.g., Dunlop, The Limits of Legal Compulsion, 27
LAB. L.J. 67 (1976); Johnson, Let the Tribunal Fit the Case-Establishing Criteriafor Chan-
neling Matters into Dispute, 80 F.R.D. 166, 167-80 (1980).
53. The authors believe that until non-adversarial processes are much better known
and much more widely understood, court referral is essential.
54. Local Rule 500 of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
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would require initial screening of a sort quite different from that re-
quired for arbitration, arbitration programs do demonstrate that a re-
ferral process is feasible. Cases appropriate for mediation could be
referred by the court on its own initiative or at the request of the par-
ties. Court referral has the advantage of letting the parties undertake
negotiations without either side having to be the first to propose settle-
ment talks.55 Settlements could be entered as orders of the court in
appropriate cases.
Mediators could be drawn from panels of appropriately trained
persons including but not limited to lawyers. Such a mixed panel is
recommended to provide for situations where process considerations
outweigh formal legal considerations. Mediation is faster and less ex-
pensive than litigation,56 so a pilot program in the court could be
funded for a relatively small amount. Costs could be defrayed by re-
quiring modest fees from participating parties, thus giving them an ad-
ded psychological investment in making the process work. If a pilot
project demonstrates cost-effectiveness and settlement results, media-
tion referral programs in the courts can readily be made self-supporting
by fees charged.
57
Our second proposal is that the federal government explore the
possibilities for mediated negotiations to resolve its own disputes. The
United States frequently is involved in public interest litigation as a
result of efforts by both corporate and public interest advocates to fore-
stall unwanted governmental action.58 Government officials often rely
on litigation to avoid politically difficult decisions. This reliance is ex-
pensive and time-consuming as well as questionable as a matter of
policy.59
California is representative of this type of court ordered arbitration, with trial de novo avail-
able on demand of either party within thirty days of entry of the arbitrator's award.
55. In the world of the advocate, the initiative and timing of an offer to discuss settle-
ment is often a carefully planned part of litigation strategy because of the perceived risks of
an untimely overture.
56. While hourly fees for mediators are comparable to those of litigation lawyers, a
mediation may require only a few hours of a mediator's time, and rarely more than a few
days, as contrasted with the enormous billing for litigation.
57. Fees could be apportioned among the parties, to reflect their relative economic ca-
pacities. For example, when one party is substantially less prosperous than another, it is not
unusual for it to offer to pay the first few days of mediation costs or some substantial per-
centage of the daily rate. Arrangements such as this tend to even out the risks of trying this
alternative.
58. An experiment in involving interested parties in negotiations over the terms of fed-
eral agency regulations prior to promulgation has already been set in motion. See Harter.
Negotiating Regulations.- A Cure/or the Malaise?, Report to the Comm. on Interagency Co-
ordination of the Administrative Conf. of the United States (Jan. 1982). While it is still too
early to appraise the effectiveness of this model, its existence is a healthy sign of willingness
by the federal government to explore alternatives to litigation.
59. Litigation against the government in the public interest area is often a prime exam-
It will not be enough to make federal mediation services avail-
able.60 Officials charged with the responsibility for developing and im-
plementing government policy must learn to think in terms of
collaborative rather than adversarial processes. This would require a
major commitment from the highest levels of government, for the liti-
gation habit is deeply ingrained.
The current economic situation is a good environment for such
redirection, however. Even if Congress did no more than include a line
item in every budget for settlement services, leaving it to each agency to
decide how to use the money, we submit that there would be measura-
ble savings by the end of each fiscal year.
Conclusion
Public interest groups, state and federal governments, and private
corporations that frequently engage in public interest disputes should
take the lead in increasing the use of negotiated alternatives to litiga-
tion. Even without the creation of new opportunities for the use of
mediation, public interest litigants can avail themselves of the services
of a growing number of private dispute resolution services.
6'
pie of the limitations of litigation in addressing the underlying issues in a dispute. Consider
the following two cases. In Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267 (D.D.C.
Cir. 1980), the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) challenged regulations of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) which exempted from statutory ban roughly 95% of com-
mercial PCB users. In a second case, Standard Oil Company attempted to secure judicial
review of FTC procedures in a pending administrative law action concerned with charges of
monopoly practices. Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 475 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
The EDF eventually obtained a court order requiring reconsideration of the exemp-
tions. During the reconsideration period (which was extended to almost two years) no com-
prehensive regulation of PCB usage has been in force, other than a limited interim
inspection program negotiated by the parties. The first of the revised EPA regulations were
not published until August 25, 1982-and were promptly challenged by both industry and
environmental groups. The regulations dealing with the bulk of the PCB problem are slated
for publication before December 1, 1983, with final regulations targeted for July 1, 1984.
This time the regulations have been the subject of intense negotiations among the interested
parties, the results of which have served as a framework for the EPA's proposals. Conversa-
tions with Jacqueline Warren, former EDF counsel, Sept. 1982, and with the EPA's Office of
Toxic Substances, Oct. 1983.
In the FTC case, after two rounds in the federal district court wrangling over discovery
rights in the administrative action, the parties ended up before the court of appeals just in
time for the FTC's voluntary dismissal of the underlying administrative action. Conversa-
tion with Marge Coleman, FTC attorney, Sept. 1982.
The question posed is whether or not these broadside attacks and protracted lawsuits
were the best way to resolve the legitimate concerns of the parties to these disputes.
60. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, which operates pursuant to 29
U.S.C. § 173(a) (1976), and the Department of Justice's Community Disputes Resolution
Program are already in place to serve as models and provide specialized services.
61. Representative are the Center for Public Resources' Judicial Panel in New York
and the San Francisco-based American Intermediation Service. Such organizations provide
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Failing some positive commitment to collaborative processes, we
will remain the victims of our own expertise. Litigation, through in-
creased refinement and abstraction, has become unbearably burden-
some and is incapable of meeting the needs of litigants in many cases.
It is as if, by improving our trial techniques, we have actually reduced
our ability to resolve conflicts. 62 Both economy and social justice will
be served by introducing collaborative conflict resolution techniques
into our procedures for settling public interest disputes.
panels of attorneys and retired jurists to assist parties in private dispute resolution processes
such as mediation, "mini-trials," and neutral fact-finding. The American Arbitration Asso-
ciation has also begun to offer assistance in non-adjudicatory dispute resolution proceedings.
62. As one commentator has pointed out: "At times it is as if litigation technology and
support dominate the lawyers' art." Lundquist, supra note 2, at 4.
(Vol. 34
